A round the world, cases of human infection with swine-origin infl uenza viruses have been reported sporadically (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) . From 1990 through 2010, a total of 27 cases of human infection with these viruses were confi rmed by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (4, 6) . Of these cases, 21 were caused by triple-reassortant infl uenza A viruses (13 subtype H1N1, 1 subtype H1N2, and 7 subtype H3N2), which have inherited genes from classical swine, avian, and human infl uenza viruses. The 2009 infl uenza pandemic, caused by a variant triple reassortant infl uenza virus, infl uenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus (7, 8) , proved that swine infl uenza viruses (SIVs) can cause widespread infection among humans and result in substantial economic costs. In 2010, an increase in the number of human cases of swine-origin infl uenza (H3N2) virus infection prompted selection of a candidate vaccine virus of swine origin, A/Minnesota/11/2010 (H3N2)v (9) .
Systematic surveillance and characterization of novel viruses infecting humans and SIVs in swine are critical for early detection of viruses with pandemic potential. Since 2009, CDC has provided public health laboratories with a real-time reverse transcription PCR (rRT-PCR)-based assay for diagnostic testing for infl uenza (10) . This assay enables detection and discrimination of infl uenza A virus subtypes H1N1, H3N2, and H1N1pdm09 and preliminary identifi cation of triple-reassortant viruses possessing the nucleoprotein gene originating from SIVs.
The Study
In 2011, public health laboratories in 5 states detected 12 cases of human infection with a novel variant of infl uenza virus, infl uenza A(H3N2)v virus, by using the CDC rRT-PCR protocol. Respiratory specimens from these patients were sent to CDC for virus confi rmation. History of direct or indirect contact with swine was confi rmed for 6 patients. However, swine contact could not be verifi ed for the other 6, suggesting that these infections might have been contracted through limited person-to-person transmission (11-13) ( Table 1 ). All 12 patients recovered fully from their illness (10) (11) (12) .
Genetic sequence analysis of RNA isolated from clinical respiratory specimens (Table 1 ) revealed that these infl uenza A(H3N2)v viruses possessed a combination of gene segments not previously found in humans ( Figure 1 According to genetic analysis results, amino acid diversity among infl uenza A(H3N2)v hemagglutinins was low (0-3 aa) compared with that of infl uenza A/ Minnesota/11/2010. In addition, there have been no conserved amino acid changes in the hemagglutinin when comparing 2011 infl uenza A(H3N2)v from humans with 2011 infl uenza A(H3N2) SIVs. In particular, the known receptor binding site of the hemagglutinin protein of infl uenza A(H3N2)v virus was typical of SIV A(H3N2) viruses recently isolated in North America.
Hemagglutinins of the infl uenza A(H3N2)v viruses differed substantially from the hemagglutinin of the 2011-12 human seasonal vaccine virus, A/Perth/16/2011 (58-60 aa), which resulted from divergent evolutionary paths for the H3 hemagglutinin in swine and human viruses. The effect of these substitutions on virus antigenicity was examined in the hemagglutinationinhibition assay by using a panel of reference ferret antiserum. Hemagglutination-inhibition analysis of 6 available infl uenza A(H3N2)v virus isolates revealed no measureable inhibition by antiserum against the current human seasonal infl uenza A(H3N2) vaccine virus, A/ Perth/16/2009 ( Table 2) , indicating that infl uenza A(H3N2)v virus is antigenically distinct from infl uenza A(H3N2) viruses currently circulating among humans.
All infl uenza A(H3N2)v viruses tested were antigenically similar, demonstrating hemagglutination-inhibition titers with only a 2-fold difference from antiserum against other infl uenza A(H3N2)v viruses. These viruses were also antigenically closely related to earlier human triple-reassortant virus isolates that contained the M gene from classical SIVs (A/Wisconsin/12/2010, A/ Pennsylvania/14/2010, and A/Minnesota/11/2010). All infl uenza A(H3N2)v viruses tested were also antigenically closely related to the proposed vaccine reassortant X-203 (13) between triple-reassortant A/Minnesota/11/2010 (H3N2) and A/PR/8/34 (H1N1) ( Table 2) .
The level of cross-protective immunity against infl uenza A(H3N2)v in humans previously vaccinated and/or exposed to previously circulated seasonal infl uenza A(H3N2) viruses is unknown. The antigenic characterization described here demonstrates that vaccination with the current trivalent infl uenza vaccine might not provide immune protection against infl uenza A(H3N2)v virus. A vaccine containing a contemporary infl uenza A(H3N2)v or an antigenically similar virus (such as A/Minnesota/11/2010) might be needed to elicit protective immunity.
Functional neuraminidase inhibition assays indicated that 6 infl uenza A(H3N2)v virus isolates were sensitive to the neuraminidase inhibitors oseltamivir and zanamivir. No genetic markers known to decrease sensitivity to neuraminidase inhibitors were found in the neuraminidase genes of all 12 infl uenza A(H3N2)v viruses. Similar to pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses, infl uenza A(H3N2)v viruses have genetic markers (V27A, S31N) in the M2 protein that confer resistance to the antiviral medications amantadine and rimantadine.
Conclusions
The detection of multiple cases of human infection with infl uenza A(H3N2)v virus within a 5-month period in 5 US states, coupled with possible human-to-human transmission, underscores the need for continued infl uenza surveillance at the swine-human interface. Coordinated surveillance of human and animal infl uenza viruses enables rapid detection of human infections with novel infl uenza viruses and timely identifi cation of new virus variants in swine. As was evident during the 2009 infl uenza pandemic, this information is vital for development of resources that might be needed to effectively respond to the emergence and spread of a novel infl uenza virus in humans.
